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The United States Supreme Court remains active in the area 
of arbitration law, deciding between one and three arbitration 
cases per term over the course of the last five or so years. 
Despite their recentness, many of these arbitration decisions 
are already considered “landmark” cases, drastically affecting 
the way attorneys, arbitrators, and judges approach arbitration 
cases.  This short article recounts some of the most important 
arbitration decisions of the last decade, focusing on cases 
relating to labor and employment issues and class action issues.
The first section of this article considers cases dealing 
with labor and employment issues, as well as statutory issues. 
This section focuses primarily on the 2009 case of 14 Penn 
Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009), 
which upheld the enforceability of a provision in a collective 
bargaining agreement (CBA) requiring individual union 
members to arbitrate their statutory claims.  The second 
section of this article primarily considers the Stolt-Nielsen-
Jackson-Concepcion “trilogy” of cases dealing with class action 
and arbitrability issues.  
Part I – Labor/Employment and 
Statutory Claims Cases
Until the Pyett decision, the realms of labor arbitration 
and employment arbitration remained relatively separate.  In 
the employment sphere, the Supreme Court has consistently 
enforced arbitration agreements between employers and 
individual employees following the 1991 landmark case of 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp, 500 U.S. 20 (1991).2  
The Gilmer Court essentially held that employees can 
effectively vindicate their statutory rights in the arbitral forum 
and that the waiver of a jury trial was not a waiver of the 
protections afforded by the employment statutes, such as the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act.3 
Unlike the area of employment law, the precedent in the area 
of labor law was considerably less favorable towards arbitration 
of statutory claims of individual union members.  In 1974, the 
Supreme Court decided in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 
U.S. 36 (1974), that an employer could not compel a union-
represented employee to arbitrate statutory claims because of 
the potential conflict of interest between the union and the 
employee.4  In Wright v. Universal Maritime Services, Corp., 
525 U.S. 70 (1998), the Court further held that a unionized 
employee could not be required to submit a statutory claim to 
arbitration unless the CBA “clearly and unmistakably” waived 
the judicial forum within the CBA.  Prior to Pyett, however, 
many lower courts, as well as many practitioners, read Gardner-
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Denver and Wright to mean that unions could not waiver the 
judicial forum for the resolution of individual union member’s 
cases involving statutory rights.
The Supreme Court in Pyett, however, held exactly the 
opposite.  The Pyett case involves a CBA for a group of 
employees in the building-services industry, such as cleaners, 
porters, and doorpersons.  The CBA specifically required that 
claims for discrimination falling under Title VII, the ADA, the 
ADEA, and other similar laws “be subject to the grievance and 
arbitration process . . . as the sole remedy for violations.”  Pyett, 
129 S. Ct. at 1461.  The Court flatly rejected the argument that 
a collective bargaining unit could not waive the judicial forum 
for the resolution of the employee’s individual statutory rights. 
Id. at 1464.  The Court rejected the employees’ argument that 
“the arbitration clause here is outside the permissible scope 
of the collective-bargaining process because it affects the 
‘employee’s individual, non-economic statutory rights.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  According to the Court, if 
a union wanted to waive the judicial forum in these cases, such a 
concession on the part of the union could be made “in return for 
other concessions from the employer[, and that c]ourts generally 
may not interfere in this bargained-for exchange.”  Id.  In other 
words, the litigation forum can be bargained for in the same 
manner as wages, hours, and other terms of the agreement.  
With respect to the Denver-Gardner line of cases, the 
Court read that case (and cases following Gardner-Denver) as 
one not involving a contract that provided for the arbitration 
of statutory claims.  Id. at 1467 (citing Gardner-Denver, 415 
U.S. at 49-50).  Instead, the Court read these cases for the 
question of the procedure involving subsequent litigation in 
cases in which the CBA covers some grievances (non-statutory) 
but not others (statutory claims).  Id. at 1468-69.  The Court 
also rejected the conflict-of-interest argument, holding that 
“unions certainly balance the economic interests of some 
employees against the needs of the larger work force . . . [b]
ut this attribute of organized labor does not justify singling out 
an arbitration provision for disfavored treatment.”  Id. at 1472. 
Given that statutory claims can be arbitrated, the second 
question for the court was an easy one – does the ADEA permit 
the arbitration of claims falling under the statute?  Clearly the 
answer to this question is “yes,” and has been “yes,” ever since 
the Court decided Gilmer in 1991.  On this point, the Court 
stated that the “Gilmer Court’s interpretation of the ADEA 
fully applies in the collective-bargaining context.  Nothing in 
the law suggests a distinction between the status of arbitration 
agreements signed by an individual employee and those agreed 
to by a union representative.”  Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1465.  The 
Court reaffirmed its earlier precedent that the “waiver” involved 
in the case is not the waiver of a statutory right, but only the 
waiver of a judicial forum.  Id. (citing Wright, 525 U.S. at 80). 
Given that the waiver in this case was clear and unmistakable, 
the Pyett decision simply answered the open question in Wright 
regarding the ability of a union to waive the judicial forum for 
its members for the resolution of statutory rights.  
Although not a labor decision, the 2012 decision in 
Compucredit Corp. v. Greenwood, No. 10-948, 565 U.S. ___ 
(2012), further upholds the ruling in Gilmer and continues to 
support the arbitrability of statutory claims.  Compucredit involves 
a class action claim by consumers under the Credit Repair 
Organizations Act (CROA) for alleged misrepresentations 
made to them regarding the available credit limits under 
certain credit cards and the fees associated with those cards. 
Id.  The CROA requires that creditors give certain notices to 
cardholders, one of which states that the cardholders have a 
“right to sue a credit repair organization.”  Id.  The act also has 
a non-waiver provision, meaning that any attempt by the credit 
repair organization to waive the protections of the statute would 
be void.  In Compucredit, the plaintiffs received the requisite 
disclosure, but the contracts also had arbitration agreements.
The question for the Court was whether the arbitration 
agreement constituted a waiver of ` the “right to sue” provision, thus 
voiding the contractual requirement to arbitrate.  Unsurprisingly, 
the Court found the claim arbitrable and found that the 
requirements under the CROA are to provide a Congressionally-
written notice to consumers, and nothing more.  Id.  Just as 
in the long line of cases culminating with Gilmer, the Court 
examined the legislation at issue to determine whether Congress 
intended to preclude the waiver of the judicial forum in cases 
falling under the statute.  Id. (citing Gilmer, Shearson/American 
Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (involving RICO), 
and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 472 
U.S. 614 (1985) (involving the Clayton Act)).  The Court found 
nothing in the text of the CROA that would guarantee a judicial 
forum but only that the power to impose liability (be it in a 
specific court or in arbitration) be preserved.  Id.  If Congress 
had intended to provide a judicial forum, the Court reasoned that 
the legislation should have specifically stated that arbitration of 
such statutory claims not be allowed.  Because Congress was not 
so specific, then the arbitration of such claims is not prohibited.
Reading Compucredit and Pyett together, the Court has 
continued its strong pro-arbitration stance in both the labor 
context and the statutory context.  If Congress does not intend 
for the arbitration of claims under certain statutes, then the 
burden is on Congress to put within the text of the legislation 
(or clearly within the legislative history) language indicating that 
parties cannot waive their right to a judicial forum for resolution 
of disputes under the statutes.  Simply making a judicial recourse 
for wronged parties is not enough because the Court has now 
consistently held that the provision of a judicial forum is not 
necessarily a barrier to the arbitration of cases under those statutes. 
On the Congressional side, recent years have shown 
some signs of increased activism on the part of Congress to 
ruLIngS affECt EMPLoyMEnt and CLaSS aCtIon arBItratIonS
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One of the cases to go through the AAA process was Stolt-
Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010). 
Stolt-Nielsen involved a case between business parties in an 
international shipping contract.  The arbitration agreement at 
issue did was silent on the issue of class arbitration, and the 
AAA arbitrator ruled that the silent clause could be construed to 
support class arbitration.  Id. at 1765-66.  The Stolt-Nielsen court 
held that a silent arbitration clause cannot be read to permit a 
class-action procedure, and that the Bazzle case did not support 
the proposition that a silent clause could be read to permit such 
a procedure.  Id. at  1772.  In fact, the Court went so far as to 
hold that the arbitrators “exceeded their powers” under §10 of 
the FAA, which is a standard of review considered to be quite 
limited.  The Supreme Court found that a silent clause did not 
evidence an agreement to participate in class arbitration “because 
class-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such 
a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it 
by simply agreeing to submit their disputes to an arbitrator.”  Id. 
at 1775.  The Court stressed the differences between bilateral 
arbitration and class arbitration, such as the number of parties, 
the lack of confidentiality, the involvement of absent parties, 
and the stakes involved in the case.  Id. at 1776.  Under these 
circumstances, the Court ruled that parties could not have a class 
procedure if the agreement to arbitrate is silent on the issue.  
The Court’s more recent decision in AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, No. 09-893 (2010), takes the Stolt-Nielsen decision 
a step further.  While Stolt-Nielsen dealt with a case involving 
an arbitration clause silent on the issue of class actions, the 
Concepcion case involved an express ban on the use of classwide 
arbitration.  The plaintiffs in Concepcion filed suit against one 
of AT&T’s predecessors to recover false advertising damages 
in the amount of $30.22 per person in fees charged for a “free 
phone.”  The plaintiffs claimed that the class action arbitration 
ban was unconscionable under California law.  At the time, 
California law included an unconscionability test known as the 
Discover Bank test that invalidated class action waivers in the 
consumer context if the plaintiff could prove that the dispute 
involved predictably small amount of damages, and that the 
party with the greater bargaining power carried out a scheme 
to exploit a large amount of people out of a small amount of 
money each.  The lower courts found the class action waiver 
unconscionable and void under the Discover Bank rule.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding that the 
FAA preempted the Discover Bank rule.  The Court held that, 
although the Discover Bank rule did not single out arbitration 
in its text, the rule would have “a disproportionate impact on 
arbitration agreements” and “interferes with arbitration.  Id. 
The Court then reaffirmed its decision in Stolt-Nielsen, again 
emphasizing the differences between bilateral arbitration and 
class arbitration.  Those differences include the fact that class 
intervene and limit the ability of parties to arbitrate.  Over the 
course of the last five years, Congresspersons have introduced 
differing versions of the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA) that 
would have the effect of nullifying all pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements in the employment, consumer, and civil rights 
contexts.  Although the passage of such a broad AFA appears 
unlikely (and likely ill advised)  in today’s political climate, 
recent attempts to limit arbitration in certain contexts has been 
a more successful solution for anti-arbitration supporters.  For 
instance, Congress passed the Jamie Leigh Jones/Al Franken 
Amendment, which prohibits the use of pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements for tort claims (such as battery or sexual assault) in 
employment agreements with defense contractors.  Similarly, 
Al Franken (and others) introduced the Consumer Mobile 
Fairness Act (CMFA), which would invalidate pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses with consumers purchasing wireless services.
At this time, it is still unclear how many CBAs will include 
Pyett-inspired arbitration clauses covering statutory claims, and 
the commentators have certainly split on whether such clauses 
are a good idea.5  Given the Supreme Court’s consistent rulings 
with respect to arbitrability of statutory claims, unless Congress 
intervenes in a systematic way (such as through a bill like the 
AFA) or in a piecemeal, industry-specific manner (such as the 
CMFA), those with contracts to arbitrate statutory claims will 
likely be unsuccessful in arguing that they cannot vindicate 
their statutory rights in the arbitral forum.
Part II – Cases Involving Class actions 
and arbitrability
The second line of noteworthy cases of the past few years 
deals with the issues of class actions and arbitrability.  Class 
action arbitration is an important topic in employment law, and 
these cases are equally applicable to the employment context, 
although they involved factual situations in the consumer and 
commercial contexts.  
The first class-action arbitration case the Supreme Court 
decided was Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 538 U.S. 
444 (2003).  The Bazzle case concerned the issue of who 
decided whether claimants in arbitration could proceed as a 
class when the arbitration clause at issue does not address the 
issue (i.e., the clause is “silent”).  A plurality of the Supreme 
Court ruled that the arbitrator – not the court – should have 
decided whether the class procedure was supported by the 
arbitration clause.  Following Bazzle, the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA) responded and created Supplemental Rules 
for Class Arbitrations (Supplemental Rules) and a public Class 
Arbitration docket.6  Under the Supplemental Rules, arbitrators 
are tasked with determining whether a silent contract supports 
a class arbitration.  Supplemental R. 3.7  The AAA created a 
successful class arbitration program, handling hundreds of cases.8 ➡
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dispute arbitration clauses in consumer and employment cases. 
The Supreme Court has deeply entrenched itself into these 
positions, and Congressional action appears to be the only way 
to change the precedent set forth by the Court. 
Endnotes
1 Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of 
Law.  J.D., Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, 2004.
2 In 2001, the Supreme Court’s decision in Circuit City Stores, 
Inc. v. Adams, 352 U.S. 105 (2001), made clear that the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., applied to all workers 
engaged in interstate commerce with the exception of certain inter-
state transportation workers, such as railroad employees or seamen.
3 Of course, an employee could challenge an arbitration agree-
ment on other grounds.   For instance, in Green Tree Financial 
Corporation of Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), the 
Supreme Court left open the possibility that plaintiffs could prove 
that the financial burden of arbitration could impede an employee’s 
ability to vindicate his or her statutory rights.  In addition, arbitra-
tion agreements can be challenged on the grounds of a contract-
law defense under §2 of the FAA, such as unconscionability or 
duress.  For a classic example of an unconscionable agreement to 
arbitrate in the employment context, see Hooters of America, Inc. v. 
Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).  The arbitration agreement 
in the Hooters case included lopsided obligations on the parts of 
the employer and employee and included a provision that allowed 
Hooters to control the pool of potential arbitrators. 
4 Labor unions operate to protect the majority, and not necessarily 
the individual employee.  Accordingly, the rights of the majority 
will prevail over the rights of the individual if the two sets of 
rights conflict.  For example, a union is legitimately permitted 
to forgo pursing some grievances to the final step (i.e., arbitra-
tion) of the dispute resolution procedure if the costs of such 
a procedure would pose a concern to the financial well-being 
of the union as a whole.  Michael Z. Green, Examining the 
Current Merger of Labor and Employment Arbitration, 2011 ABA 
Section of Labor and Employment Law ADR in Labor and 
Employment Law Committee Mid-Winter Meeting, at 6.  
5 See, e.g., Margaret L. Moses, The Pretext of Textualism: 
Disregarding Stare Decisis in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 14 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 825 (2010); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Let 
the Grand Experiment Begin: Pyett Authorizes Arbitration of 
Unionized Employees’ Statutory Discrimination Claims, 14 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 861 (2010); David L. Gregory & Edward 
McNamara, Mandatory Labor Arbitration of Statutory Claims, 
and the Future of Fair Employment: 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 19 
CORNELL J. L & PUB. POLICY 429 (2010); Brendan D. 
Cummis & Nicole M. Blissenbach, The Law of the Land in Labor 
Arbitration: The Impact of 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 25 ABA J. 
OF LAB. & EMP. L. 159 (Winter 2010).
6 The Supplemental Rules can be found at:  http://www.adr.org/
sp.asp?id=21936.
7 The Supplemental Rules provide for a three-step class-arbitration 
process.  In the first step, the arbitrator examines the contract to 
determine whether a class procedure can even occur.  If the case 
passes the first step, then the second step involves the arbitrator 
determining whether to certify a class, using a standard similar to 
the standards set forth in the civil rules (Civil Rule 23).  Finally, 
the arbitrator decides the case on the merits.  The Supplemental 
Rules also give the participants an opportunity to appeal the deci-
sion following the conclusion of each of these stages.   
8 The AAA still has more than 300 active cases on its class action 
docket.
9 An argument exists that arbitrators would be more likely to rule 
in a self-serving manner and find that the agreements are not 
unconscionable so that they can keep working on the case and 
resolve the merits of the dispute.  Any instance in which arbitra-
tors rule on their own jurisdiction poses potential questions of 
bias and self-serving in the decision-making process.    
arbitration is “slower, more costly, and more likely to generate 
procedural morass than final judgment.”  Id. The Court was 
also concerned about the increased required formality of class 
arbitration and how bilateral arbitration was not intended to have 
such procedural formality.  The Court also expressed skepticism 
on the part of the arbitrators’ ability to handle class cases.  
Thus, under Concepcion, class action waivers appear to be 
enforceable.  Reading Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion together, 
the only way that consumers (or employees, for that matter) 
can have a class action procedure in arbitration is if the parties 
specifically allow for class arbitration, which is highly unlikely. 
For companies and employers, now, all they need to do is to not 
say anything at all about class arbitration to prohibit the action, 
and the waivers are less likely to be found unconscionable 
following Concepcion.
The final case in the recent arbitration “trilogy” is the 
2010 case of Rent-a-Center v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772 (2010). 
Although Jackson does not deal with class actions, it does 
deal with the power of arbitrators to determine questions of 
arbitrability.  Jackson involved an employment claim and an 
arbitration agreement that gave the arbitrator the ability to 
determine his or her own jurisdiction (the “delegation clause”). 
Jackson challenged the arbitration agreement as unconscionable, 
and the question before the Court was who was to decide the 
question of unconscionability.  Applying the “separability” 
principles of Prima Paint, the Court held that any challenge to an 
agreement with a delegation clause could only be leveled against 
the delegation clause.  In other words, the unconscoinability 
challenge could not be made to the arbitration agreement as a 
whole, but only to the delegation clause. Id. at 2780.  
The fallout of Jackson is that an increased number of 
decisions can be delegated to an arbitrator, including decisions 
regarding the creation of the arbitration agreement.  After 
Jackson, companies would be well advised to include delegation 
clauses in their contracts in order to insulate the agreement 
from challenge and to give as many questions as possible to an 
arbitrator and out of the courts.9  In reading all three of these 
cases together, the Supreme Court has been extraordinary 
friendly to business interests.  Business can now impose upon 
consumers and employees arbitration agreements that require 
individual arbitration and that have the arbitrators, by and 
large, determining their own jurisdiction and the defenses to 
nearly all of the possible challenges to the mediation agreement.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s interest in arbitration remains strong, 
and the consistent messages that ring from the Court’s decisions 
support the arbitration of individual claims and increased 
power in the hands of the arbitrator.  How parties – particularly 
businesses and employers – react will be something that time 
will tell, but it might be safe to anticipate increased use of pre-
